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LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE.* By Sissela
Bok. New York: Pantheon Books. 1978. Pp. xxii, 326. $10.95.

0 what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive!•

Parents, clergymen, and teachers warn us throughout our
lives of the evils of dishonesty, yet lying remains among the most
consistent characteristics of human behavior. Why is lying bad?
Are lies ever justifiable? How can a society evaluate the merits
of some of its most accepted and pervasive patterns of deception?,
Sissela Bok's recent book probes these disconcerting questions
perceptively, intelligently, and readably. Although she fails to
provide indisputable answers, she demonstrates that the issues
are susceptible to rational discussion by sensitive individuals.
The first third of the book establishes the theoretical background to Bok's view of the subject. She adopts a broad definition-a lie is any statement made with the intention to deceive-to give her analysis maximum scope. She then presents
capsule criticisms of two approaches moral theorists have traditionally taken to the issue of deception. Building largely on the
hypothetical situation in which a lie may be.necessary to save a
life, she rejects the rigid Kantian theory which condemns all lies. 2
Nevertheless, she rejects with equal vehemence any simpleminded utilitarian approach that would permit a prospective liar
to balance the benefits and harms that he believes a lie would
cause. Such an approach ignores the damage a lie does to the liar
himself (in energy expended to cover up, in loss of credibility
should he be discovered, and in increased propensity to tell future
lies) and the damage it does to the overall level of trust in communication throughout society. Even more dangerous is the fact that
the liar's perspective is often biased: he underestimates the risk
of discovery and overestimates the consequential benefits of a lie.
Finally, Bok points out that the liar is prone to ignore the significant difference between lies that tend to become institutional
practices (such as placebo prescriptions by physicians) and lies
that are truly isolated occurrences.
The author's system for determining the justifiability of any
lie is based in moral philosophy3 and has three essential compo*

This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.
1. SIR WALTER ScoTT, Marmion, in 5 THE WORKS OF WALTER SCOTT, EsQ. 1, 343
(Edinburgh 1813).
2. For a modern neo-Kantian view of lying, see C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78
(1978).
3. Bok appears to have been strongly influenced by the thinking ofR.F. Harrod. She
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nents. Primary is the "principle of veracity": Lies are not neutral-they always have harmful side effects; therefore, a lie is
never justified if there is an adequate truthful alternative. The
second feature of Bok's system. is a refined utilitarianism: A lie
for which no truthful alternative exists is to be evaluated according to its costs and benefits, but all costs must be considered-costs to the liar, to the deceived, and to society. All costs
cannot be considered, however, unless one subdues one's biases
and appreciates all perspectives-that of the liar and that of the
dupe, that of the individual case and that of the general practice
which includes the case. Finally, the author invokes the
"principle of publicity": To be morally justified, a lie must be
defensible before the community of "reasonable persons" in general. Such an audience would, in theory, be able to adopt the
perspective of the deceived as easily as that of the liar and would
therefore check any biases to which a single individual or profession may be victim.
The author does not attempt a complete theoretical scheme
that could unambiguously determine the merits of any lie. Such
an ambition would necessitate, among other things, a thorough
definition of the "reasonable person" and a precise value judgment concerning the relative importance of the individual and
the group. This modesty does not diminish, however, her book's
contribution to the discipline of applied ethics. Bok's principles
harbor a moral judgment which coincides with many traditional
democratic majoritarian values and which therefore will resonate
with many readers' intuitive processes of rationalization. Even if
her principles do not specify the direction in which the scales will
ultimately tip in an individual case, they suggest factors to be
considered and procedures by which to weigh them.
In the remainder of the book, Bok applies her principles to
several widely acknowledged patterns of deception, patterns
which many deem justified. Her analyses of such topics as white
lies, lies to children, lies for "the public good" (Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein receive particularly pointed criticism), lies to
the sick and dying, and lies in letters of recommendation will
surely provoke many a fascinating dinner-table discussion. Few
readers will be able to escape the author's conclusion that our
society has been far too glib in its acceptance of mendacity whenincludes an excerpt from Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, 45 MIND 137, 147-54 (1936), and
excerpts from other notable essays on deception, in a valuable thirty-nine page appendix
to her book.
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ever a greater good is arguably promoted. 4
Of special interest to lawyers is the latter part of chapter XI,
in which Bok discusses the attorney-client privilege. She begins
with Monroe Freedman's argument that a lawyer has a professional responsibility to build upon his client's testimony in arguing before a court, even when he has strong grounds to think the
testimony perjurious. 5 Although Bok 1mpiicitly suggests that
more lawyers accept Professor Freedman's view than is the case, 6
her substantive analysis sharpens a decade's debate.7 In particular, her publicity principle suggests that the legal profession's
attempt to define the privilege has courted moral bias by failing
to consult laymen.
The problem here, as with many other deceptive professional practices, is that the questions are too often left up to the professionals
themselves, whereas the issues obviously touch the public welfare
immediately. There is, then, a great need for a wider debate and
analysis of these issues. . . . Such a debate would have to go far
beyond the confines of the American Bar Association and the
teaching of professional responsibility in law schools. [P.162]

Bok does not want public control of the debate; rather, she wants
the public to participate in and to know about its resolution.
When thirty-eight percent of the nation agrees that "most lawyers would engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client
in an important case, " 8 a profession anxious to regain its dignity
might heed such friendly criticism.
4. This acceptance is satirized in J. R. Pope's conclusion to Scott's famous epigram
quoted in the text at note 1 supra:
But when we've practiced quite a while
How vastly we improve our style!
Quoted in ESPY, AN Af.MANAC oF WoRDS AT PLAY 215 (1975).
5. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETlilcs IN AN ADVERSARY S'YSTEM (1975); Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1469 (1966).
6. For a thorough evaluation of the current views of the courts and the organized bar, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 809 (1977).
But see M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 38, which cites a survey in which 90% of the
attorneys responding stated that they would call a perjurious client to th~ stand and
question him in the normal manner. The discrepancy between the attitudes expressed
publicly by scholars and the actual practices of courtroom lawyers may indicate the
ethical strain felt daily by many attorneys. It would seem, therefore, that all members
of the profession would benefit from an intensive public effort to clarify the lawyer-client
relationship.
·
·
.
7. See, e.g., G. HAzARD, ET1Ucs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 120-35 (1978); Lefst~m, The
Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma,
6 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 665 (1978); Polster, The Dilemma of the Perjurious Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. REs. L. R.Ev. 3 (1977).
8. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBUC 232 (1977).
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Sissela Bok's work may dissatisfy purists who seek a fully
developed philosophical theory of lying. To people who face difficult moral choices in their daily lives, however, Lying is a persuasive invitation to tackle those choices head-on and a demonstration that a few theoretical guidelines can prove powerful allies
in the ethical struggle.

